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In the last decade, the UK New Labour government has emphasised tenant participation
in housing policy. Consequently, those individuals who decide to opt out of participation
processes have been problematised as ‘apathetic’, and identiﬁed as needing to be
‘empowered’ through professional interventions. Drawing on research about community
ownership in Glasgow, this paper argues that tenants’ reasons for not getting involved
are more than simply lack of interest. Tenants articulated an instrumental approach to
participation, and rejected the conﬂation of tenant participation with tenant management.
Practical barriers also obstructed their latent motivation.
I n t roduct ion
Tenant participation is an important and defining feature of housing policy under New
Labour (Goodlad, 2001). A label which captures a range of different structures, processes
and forms, tenant participation refers to the involvement of tenants in the housing services
provided by their landlord (Hickman, 2006)1. It has been translated into a number of
distinct initiatives including Best Value, Tenant Participation Compacts, and in Scotland,
the statutory right to tenant participation for social housing tenants (Scott, 2004;Milnward,
2005; Hickman, 2006; Simmons and Birchall, 2007). Across Great Britain this emphasis
on tenants as service users is further evident in attempts to modernise social housing by
transforming its funding, organisation and management – a goal that is to be achieved
through housing stock transfer (Scottish Office, 1999; DETR, 2000; Welsh Assembly
Government, 2003).2
Whilst tenant participation remains very much an ill-defined and slippery concept
(Goodlad, 2001), it has nonetheless been portrayed as ‘self-evidently a good thing’, with
its benefits presented in ‘glowing terms’ (Riseborough, 1998: 230–8). By assuming that
individuals will behave ‘responsibly’ and get involved, simultaneously those who choose
to opt out of participation processes have been constructed as apathetic, alienated
or excluded, with their lack of desire to act in their own interests questioned and
subsequently ‘problematised’ (Cruikshank, 1999; McKee and Cooper, 2008).
In this context, tenant participation emerges as a fundamentally ‘moral’ project,
in which ‘opting out is. . .not part of the message’ (Riseborough, 1998: 238; see also
Flint, 2003). Yet this political ambition to address dependency on the state and promote
a more active, empowered citizenry is also evident beyond the housing arena, in
diverse fields such as welfare (Cruikshank, 1999; McDonald and Marston, 2005) and
local government/public sector reform (Newman, 2001; Clarke et al., 2007). It is not
however just autonomy and control that is being devolved, but also the responsibilities
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of citizenship (Flint, 2003). This emphasis on ‘obligation’ reflects a significant shift in
state–citizen relations towards a more conditional, and potentially exclusionary, form of
citizenship (Dwyer, 2002; Clarke, 2005). It has been a defining and enduring feature of
New Labour’s social policy reforms post-1997 (Heron and Dwyer, 1999).
In order to interrogate this top–down political desire to ‘responsibilise’ social housing
tenants through their active involvement in decisions relating to their housing, it is
important to go beyond normative agendas, which simply reverberate the benefits of
tenant participation and governance (Somerville, 1998, 2005), or individuals’ motivations
to get involved (Milnward, 2005). The aim here is not to neglect nor undermine the
undoubted benefits the participation process can offer (Paddison et al., 2008). Rather
it is to foster a more critical analysis of the participatory process, which considers
how discourses of ‘apathy’ may be used to divide the tenant group and legitimate
professional interventions, and provide a critical space in which tenants’ own reasons
for non-involvement can be articulated. The paper seeks to advance this research agenda
by exploring these issues through the case study of community ownership of social
housing in Glasgow. It begins with a discussion of the background to the study and the
research methods used. This is followed by an emphasis on the centrality of discourses of
empowerment to theGlasgow transfer framework, and the subsequent problematisation of
‘inactive’ tenants. Through focus group research, tenants’ reasons for non-involvement and
their appetite for tenant management through community ownership are then explored.
The paper concludes by emphasising the need for housing policy to recognise the right
of tenants to choose how and when they get involved, if at all.
Commun i t y ownersh ip in G lasgow: the po l i cy contex t
Since the creation of the Scottish Parliament in 1999, the Scottish Executive’s3 solution
to modernising social housing has been to posit stock transfer as a policy vehicle
to inject additional financial resources and to transform housing governance (Scottish
Office, 1999). This has resulted in former council housing being transferred out of the
public sector, and therefore from direct management by the local authority, to non-profit
registered social landlords (RSLs) situated within the voluntary sector. Given the tradition
of small-scale, neighbourhood-level stock transfers within Scotland, this is a policy that
has been labelled ‘community ownership’ (Clapham et al., 1996; Clapham and Kintrea,
2000; McKee, 2007, 2008; Paddison et al., 2008).
Given Glasgow’s well-documented legacy of poor housing, urban decay and social-
economic deprivation (Gibb, 2003), it was deemed by the Scottish Executive that if this
flagship policy of community ownership could not succeed there, it could not succeed
anywhere (Kintrea, 2006). Following a successful tenant ballot, the entirety of Glasgow’s
council housingwas transferred to the newly createdGlasgowHousing Association (GHA)
in 2003 (Daly et al., 2005). As the size of the Glasgow transfer was significantly larger
than traditional community ownership transfers, and the issues inevitably more complex,
a two-tier stock transfer process was proposed. From the outset, housing management
was devolved to a citywide network of community-based Local Housing Organisations
(LHOs), which was to be complemented by plans for further Second Stage Transfers,
in order that these local organisations may own as well as manage the housing (McKee,
2007). The Glasgow stock transfer was therefore not an end in itself. Rather it was a policy
vehicle to achieve wider political ambitions such as community ownership, community
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governance and local control, as well as provide a new source of investment for social
housing in the city. As such, it represents an ideal case study with which to explore
the complexities and nuances surrounding why tenants choose to opt out of formal
participation processes.
The research
The research was conducted in Glasgow between August 2005 and April 2006. It involved
a plethora of qualitative methods: both community-level case study research, as well as
work with key actors at the citywide/national level. This included 54 semi-structured
interviews with local housing staff, committee members and key actors; analysis of
key documents at the local, citywide and national levels; observation of committee
meetings and other pertinent local and strategic events; and five focus groups involving 36
tenants who were not actively involved in their local management committee. The case
studies involved two LHOs involved in the GHA’s pilot Second Stage Transfer programme
and as a comparator an RSL operating outwith the GHA context.
Given the difficulty of presenting rich qualitative data within a limited word count,
summarised memos have been used for focus group data (Catterall and Maclaran, 1997).
By complementing stand-alone quoteswith an analysis of group dynamics and interaction,
this has the advantage of offering a ‘moving picture’ of the data as well as a ‘snapshot’
(1997: 1). Where direct quotes are used the author’s comments are in italics.
‘Empower ing ’ G lasgow’s tenants th rough commun i t y ownersh ip
The 2003 housing stock transfer of Glasgow’s council housing, or community ownership
as the former Scottish Executive preferred to call it, is premised on the political ideal that
local people will actively participate in the management and ownership of their housing.
It is a governance model that seeks to put people into action rather than reaffirm their
apathy, docility or negate their involvement in local participation structures. In doing so,
it assumes that social housing tenants will act ‘responsibly’ and get involved (for further
discussion see McKee and Cooper, 2008).
Post-stock transfer, tenants have been accorded a lead role in transforming Glasgow’s
social housing, as autonomy and control has been devolved from the state to ‘active’
tenants in the context of their communities. As the quote below suggests, the explicit aim
was to challenge the bureaucracy and paternalism that were deemed to characterise the
‘council days’ by recreating social housing for the consumers (i.e. the tenants), as opposed
to the politicians and the bureaucrats.
we really understood the need for a step change in housing provision in Glasgow . . .we didn’t
want what they wanted in the past we needed a new model, and that local management
was deemed to be more effective and you could link it in with regeneration . . . And also
I think a political principle which is you should empower the people who use the service
. . . it [empowerment] was seen as a mechanism to improve housing provision and improve
communities. (Glasgow Labour, Member of the Scottish Parliament)
Although historically the City Council was innovative in pioneering models
of community housing and had a proactive Tenant Participation section (Clapham
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et al., 1996; Clapham and Kintrea, 2000; McKee, 2007), its organisational culture was
nonetheless perceived very negatively by tenants, local housing staff and key actors alike.
Central to the transfer framework was the political belief that ‘empowering’ tenants
to act in their own interests would address Glasgow’s housing ‘problem’. This was to be
achieved by establishing a more bottom–up decision-making process, in which tenants
were to be actively consulted on their views and mobilised to become involved in local
decision making. Pivotal was the creation of the LHO network in Glasgow. Governed by a
management committee comprising a majority of local tenants, these small, community-
based organisations allow residents to have their say in shaping local services to suit the
needs of their area. Not only do they provide a mechanism for tenants to get actively
involved at the community level, but they are also lead agencies in delivering community
development and regeneration in their locality. Whilst a tenant majority on a housing
association board is not uncommon in the west of Scotland, it is atypical and unusual
elsewhere in the UK. It reflects the different origins of tenant management north of the
border (Scott, 2000), as well as the Scottish emphasis on using stock transfer as a policy
vehicle to transform housing governance (Kintrea, 2006).
Despite the limitations of the Glasgow transfer in realising ambitions for full
community ownership through Second Stage Transfer of the local housing stock, it
has delivered positive change for tenants (for further discussion, see McKee, 2007). For
example, as was discussed in the previous section, over 60 LHOs have been established
across the city. Stock transfer has therefore resulted not only in the growth of the city’s
housingmovement, but also the number of active tenant committeemembers. These LHOs
have also entered into a contractual management agreement with the GHA in order to
deliver local housing management services. This affords ‘active’ tenants autonomy within
specific spheres of delegated decision making, including making local investment plans,
developing local variations to GHAmodel policies, managing staff locally and monitoring
their performance.
Beyond the LHO network, the GHA has also exceeded the baseline commitment
required by the provisions of the Housing (Scotland) Act 2001, which introduced a
statutory right to tenant participation.4 The GHA have introduced a variety of formal
structures, supported by significant financial resources in order to work towards their
end goal of involving tenants more closely with the activities of the organisation and
to improve both their methods of consultation and information provision (GHA, 2006).
Focus group research highlights that tenants not involved in formal LHO structures (i.e.
not-committee members) placed a particular emphasis on this positive change in tenant
participation post-transfer.
Importantly, this shift was understood not just in terms of the change in landlord
through stock transfer, but as indicative of a more general increase in individual citizens’
rights and their desire to enforce them.
You know it’s like a lot of things in life I think we’re a wee bit more out spoken now and say
‘wait a minute’ and ‘why?’ Even in a kind of hospital you would say to a doctor ‘I want to know’
and before you would never have spoken to a doctor or a surgeon. Now you’ve got that right
to say, ‘I’m sorry I want to know what all this involves.’ (GHA Tenant, Focus Group 5)
This reflects wider societal developments, for across a range of policy arenas citizens
have now been elevated as ‘partners’ in identifying and resolving policy problems (Barnes
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et al., 2007). Despite the government’s endeavour to democratise public services, the
tendency remains for citizens to be conceived quite narrowly as rational consumers who
can be empowered through quasi-consumerist models of participation, which emphasise
‘choice’ and ‘voice’ (Clarke et al., 2007).
Mobi l i s ing the inac t i ve
The elevation of tenant involvement in Glasgow has been accompanied by the targeting
and problematisation of those individuals who choose to opt out of participation
processes: the ‘apathetic’. Both front-line housing practitioners and active tenants
expressed a sense of frustration at the lack of wider involvement or even interest amongst
the local residents in their area. They described turnout at organised events and responses
to consultation exercises as ‘low’, and normally comprising of the ‘same old faces’ and
‘hardcore stalwarts’ who were actively involved in their community and could be relied
upon to participate. For example, in two of the three case studies the full quota of positions
on the management committee was not taken up; one case study had to hold its Annual
General Meeting again as it was initially inquorate due to an insufficient turnout from
shareholding members; and even with what can be regarded as important issues such
as the introduction of the new Scottish Secure Tenancy or on the fundamental issue of
housing stock transfer, all the case studies reported difficulty in securing attendance at
specially organised open days or public meetings.
Significantly, this reluctance of the majority to actively engage with their landlord
constructed a divide between the responsible tenants, ‘the participators’, and the other
‘negligent’ members of the community who decided to opt out of participation processes.
The passivity of their fellow tenants and their preference to ‘leave things to others’ was a
real source of irritation for ‘active’ tenants. They were exasperated by their neighbours’
lack of ‘motivation’, for they seemed quite happy to moan about their landlord and
the quality of the service provided, yet were reluctant to get together and actually do
something about it.
Are there many people involved? Not really, they [the ‘inactive’ tenants] won’t join anything;
they won’t do anything. But they’ve plenty to say a lot of them. But nobody will come forward
and do anything. (LHO Committee Member)
Without the active involvement of local residents such a model of community
governance cannot be successful, for ‘community ownership’ requires the willingness
of local residents to voluntarily give their time to mobilise around the issues that affect
them, and their wider community (McKee and Cooper, 2008). This divide, in turn, creates
an additional and reinvigorated role for front-line housing professionals. Far from being
made redundant post-stock transfer, they have been accorded a key role in maximising
tenant participation at the local level and promoting individual capacity. The political
desire to ‘empower’ Glasgow’s tenants has therefore created new avenues for professional
knowledge both in identifying potential problems in facilitating participation at the local
level, and also in offering solutions. It requires housing practitioners to be innovative
and develop more inspiring and attractive ways of engaging with their tenants, what
one housing manager described as making tenant participation more ‘more sexy’ and
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‘appealing to folk’. The expertise of housing officers, especially their knowledge of the
tenants in their area and what modes of engagement are likely to be the most successful,
is vital here. Indeed, several committee members recalled that it was the encouragement
of their own housing officer that prompted them to become involved.
The pivotal role of welfare professionals in reconciling the interests of the individual
with the goals of governance is also evident outside the housing arena. Examples include,
reconstructing the identity of the long-term unemployed as ‘active’ jobseekers (McDonald
and Marston, 2005) and urban programmes aimed at ‘empowering’ the socially excluded
(Cruikshank, 1999). Power is therefore not a zero-sum game; the political desire to
empower Glasgow’s tenants has not resulted in a loss of professional power, rather its
reconfiguration. Indeed, as Baistow (1994/5) highlights, deciding who is to be empowered
is itself a sign of power and a new form of professional practice. This does not pit officers
and tenants against each other, although it does involve judgements and assumptions
about some groups of inactive tenants.
Housing practitioners were however pragmatic about their role in facilitating
participation. Whilst they acknowledged the important job they had to play in providing
opportunities for involvement, making tenants aware how they could exercise these rights,
and supporting them in doing so, they nonetheless protested that they could not ‘force’
or ‘make’ people get involved. Rather it was a tenants’ ‘right’ to choose if, when and how
they wanted to be involved. This was not an example of housing practitioners protecting
their sphere of autonomy by trying to keep tenants out of participation processes, rather
a critique of the housing regulatory and inspection framework and its emphasis upon
‘formal’ and ‘organised’ participation structures.
I think people have a right to participate when they want to and if they want to and at what
level. I think the danger is that we all get fixated on there having to be tenant participation . . . I
see my job as being about enabling that process . . . so if people want to be involved they know
how to get involved, they know how to access it and that they’re welcomed and encouraged
into that. (Tenant Participation Officer, GHA)
Front-line housing practitioners perceived such top–down agendas as ‘unrealistic’,
and by contrast were keen to stress the organic nature of participation and the plethora
of reasons why tenants may choose to opt-out. In doing so, they demonstrated a more
sympathetic approach towards tenants’ non-involvement.
Opt ing out : a tenant ’s perspec t i ve
Focus group discussions with these ‘inactive’ tenants illustrated that their reasons for non-
involvement were inevitably more complex than can be captured by discourses of apathy.
Labelling all tenants as disinterested may therefore preclude a greater understanding as
to why tenants choose to opt out of participation processes.
When asked directly, the majority of focus group participants’ expressed no demand
for continual, formal involvement. Indeed, they had little day-to-day contact with their
landlord other than when they had a personal issue to raise, such as a repair or neighbour
complaint – they simply paid their rent and kept to themselves.
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Moderator Are there any issues, any housing issues that you would like to have more of
a say in that you don’t get at the moment?
Tenant C They [the landlord] are no bad. Anything you need done gets done very
quickly.
Moderator What about you ladies at the back are there any more issues you would like
more of a say in?
Tenant H No, no really.
Tenant L No.
Moderator Not really? Quite happy with the way things are going.
Tenant H Aye.
(GHA Tenants Focus Group 1)
As the excerpt highlights, this was legitimated in terms of being ‘satisfied’ with their
service. Landlords in turn, interpreted this lack of appetite for involvement as a sign
that they were performing well: they perceived tenants as rational actors who only got
involved when they had an ‘axe to grind’, and therefore when they were happy with the
service there was no impetus for them to get involved. This is particularly pertinent in the
stock transfer context, where the massive cash injection has allowed landlords to address
tenants’ fundamental concerns about the condition of the properties.
Tenants’ views were however somewhat contradictory: despite the majority
expressing no initial interest in getting involved, when probed if there were any issues
on which they would like ‘more of a say’, or quizzed on specific examples, the majority
responded positively as explored in the memos below:
Memo: (When I probed the group to think about practical issues they could have
more of a say in, Tenant A acknowledges involvement can be merited
under certain conditions.)
Tenant A FGI: ‘I think it would only be if something came up that they [tenants]
didn’t agree with, they should be allowed to have their say . . . just if
something got up their nose.’
Memo: (When asked if she would like to have an input into selecting colours/styles
of communal investment work, Tenant C indicated she would be interested
in having her say; this is despite her earlier lack of interest.)
Tenant C FG1: ‘That’s something I would like, because I don’t like dark gloomy
colours, I like bright.’
Memo: (This position was echoed by another participant in the group who also
placed value on having an input on decisions involving colours, styles etc.
and that this should not be restricted to the committee; discussion from
FGs 3 and 5 indicated they were already making such decisions.)
Tenant BFG1: ‘You can’t have just the LHO sitting round the table and making
decisions about colours because colours involve everyone, colours have
an emotional and a psychological effect and I don’t want them choosing
colours for me without I have a say so in it.’
Tenant N FG3: ‘A simple thing like the decoration of this hall the [paint colours] was
all there for people to look at.’
Memo: (By contrast in FG 2, one tenant argued this was a trivial issue compared
to who was moving into the houses and the decline of the area – an issue
the majority of participants expressed an interest in having more say in.)
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Tenant A FG1: ‘I think that’s a kind of triviality compared to sick in the lifts and who they
are letting move in.’
This indicates a latent motivation to participate in a range of decision making from
practical issues (e.g. colours of doors, upkeep of communal areas) to more political
questions (e.g. housing allocations, anti-social behaviour). Such an instrumental approach
to participation, in which tenants will only get involved when an issue directly affects
them, also suggests that tenants’ levels of satisfaction may only be limited and conditional.
Interestingly, the main issue that tenants articulated they wanted more control over was
housing allocations. Paradoxically, this is the very sphere of decision making they are
excluded from because it is protected by statute.5 This constraint on local autonomy and
control highlights the limitations of empowering tenants through participation processes.
Strategic policy decisions remain within the remit of central government, with citizen
participation occurring within strictly delimited parameters (for further discussion see
McKee, 2008).
Focus group discussions also indicated that a plethora of practical barriers continue to
obstruct tenants’ latent motivation to become involved. For example, tenants described:
a lack of available transport and inconvenient meeting times; the cost and availability
of childcare; a lack of awareness of the opportunities available to them; and perceived
cliques within formal participation structures. The persistence of these long-standing
issues, further underlines that there is more going on here than simply a lack of interest on
the behalf of tenants. The inability of landlords to address these barriers is striking given
the policy focus that the UK New Labour government has directed towards maximising
user involvement post-1997. Participation is not however cost free. Rather it requires
significant financial resourcing if it is to deliver its objectives.
Suppor t fo r commun i t y ownersh ip
Despite the political desire to devolve ownership and control of social housing in Glasgow
from the state to local communities, ‘community ownership’ does not appear to have
won over the hearts and minds of tenants, with focus group research indicating a striking
ambivalence towards plans for Second Stage Transfer of the housing stock. For example,
when asked if they supported community ownership in order for their LHO to own as
well as manage the local housing stock, the majority of participants from the LHO case
studies (17 out of 22 tenants) responded they simply ‘did not know’, and qualified this
statement by professing they simply did not have enough information or knowledge about
the subject to have an informed opinion. Only one tenant expressed positive support for
the proposals, with another four exhibiting strongly negative views.
In particular, one tenant expressed concern about whether there would be enough
professional support to help tenants make decisions; indeed she questioned the entire
legitimacy of tenants making decisions that involved such significant sums of money and
which had potential ramifications for other people in the community. This position was
firmly rooted in the rejection of the responsibility that tenant management demanded;
she felt this should remain with paid professionals and not lay tenants.
You need the professionals to be quite honest with you . . . I wouldn’t like to make those
decisions . . . as I say we need the professional people . . . I wouldn’t make the decisions, no
8
The ‘Responsible’ Tenant and the Problem of Apathy
way . . . there’s no way I would make decisions for all these people. (GHA Tenant, Focus Group
5)
Although this focus group research was small scale, and care therefore needs to
be taken interpreting the results, its general findings have been echoed by GHA’s own
citywide tenant survey (Communities Scotland, 2007: 46).6 Crucially, this suggests that
whilst community ownership may have become a life project and top priority for LHOs
actors (i.e. housing practitioners and ‘active’ tenants), it was not necessarily accorded the
same emphasis amongst ordinary tenants. Whilst tenants will mobilise around issues they
are interested in and affect them, this does not necessarily equate with a desire to become
involved in formalised community governance structures. By focusing overwhelmingly
on promoting local ‘ownership’, the Glasgow transfer therefore adopts a very narrow view
of participation that is overwhelmingly focused on the ‘management committee’. In this
context, tenants’ scepticism about Second Stage Transfer can be interpreted as a rejection
of the Scottish Executive’s conflation of tenant participation with tenant management.
This is a significant finding given the political emphasis upon delivering ‘community
ownership’ in Glasgow, especially as plans for Second Stage Transfer cannot be realised
without majority tenant support at local ballots.
The elision of ‘community ownership’ with tenant management was also critiqued by
key actors within the wider housing/political community. Whilst they were supportive of
the political ambition to ‘empower’ tenants, they nonetheless believed that what tenants’
wanted was ownership of decisions, but not necessarily the housing.
I would say the tenants we work with don’t see ownership as an issue . . . Not everyone
wants to get up fifty hours of their week to sit on a management board. And if you sit on a
landlord board you’re part of the landlord operation . . . This term community ownership is
a problem . . . What does ownership mean: own the houses or influence decisions; I think
local people would rather have [the] latter. (Senior Representative, Tenant/Housing Association
Representative Organisation)
The quote also highlights how tenant management may actually incorporate local
activists into established legislative and regulatory frameworks, thereby undermining their
potential for spontaneous and critical protest. Again, this underlines the need for RSLs to
consider alternative mechanisms of involvement, which enable tenants to engage on their
own terms and in pursuit of their own agendas. In this context, single issue involvement
may be just as valid as a regular participation in formal structures. Indeed, whilst housing
staff were frustrated by low turn-out at formalised events such as the Annual General
Meeting, they did recall high attendance at special open days in which tenants could
choose between different options for their new kitchens and bathrooms, or at ad-hoc
meetings where planned investment for the local area was to be discussed.
Conc lus ion
Through the case study of the Glasgow housing stock transfer, this paper has highlighted
how the emphasis on empowering social housing tenants through ‘community ownership’
has created a divide between the ‘responsible’ participants and the ‘inactive’ majority.
It has resulted in those individuals who choose to opt out of participation processes
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being constructed as apathetic, alienated or excluded, and subject to professional
interventions in order for them to be ‘empowered’ to mobilise in their own interests.
In turn, this has created new forms of professional knowledge and a reinvigorated role
for housing practitioners in enabling, facilitating and maximising tenant participation.
Power is therefore not a zero sum game, for the ‘empowerment’ of social housing tenants
is paralleled by the emergence of new professional practices. This is a finding which
is likely to have wider relevance in other fields of social policy where there has been a
similar emphasis on reconstructing the citizen as both ‘active’ and ‘responsible’ for their
own well-being.
Despite the ‘problematisation’ of inactive tenants, focus group research suggests
that tenants’ reasons for non-involvement are more than simply lack of interest. Tenants
exhibited an instrumental approach to participation, and were willing to mobilise around
issues they deemed important. Whilst this suggests a latent motivation to participate,
it nonetheless represents a rejection of the emphasis of ‘community ownership’ upon
local control of decision making, and the conflation of tenant participation with tenant
management this implies. This is significant given the top–down emphasis by governments
across the UK on modernising housing governance through stock transfer, especially in
the Scottish context with its policy emphasis on ‘community ownership’.
The more pragmatic approach to participation, as expressed by tenants themselves,
is also something that landlords need to both acknowledge and engage with directly,
by providing a diversity of opportunities for tenants to make their voices heard, both
within and beyond the management committee. The importance of landlords adopting a
proactive approach to minimising the barriers to participation also emerged as significant
– especially as these are long-standing, well-documented issues that would require little
imagination to address.
In conclusion, this paper argues for a rejection of the moral discourse underpinning
tenant participation, which assumes that tenants will behave ‘responsibly’ and get
involved. In doing so, it advocates the need to be sensitive to the varied reasons why
tenants choose not to actively participate, and for housing policy to respect the rights of
tenants to choose how they become involved, if at all. These findings are pertinent to
other spheres of social policy, in which public participation has been a central feature of
modernising reforms, and both autonomy and responsibility devolved from the state to
active citizens.
Acknowledgments
The paper is based on a doctoral research funded by the Economic and Social Research
Council. Special thanks go to those individuals and organisations that freely gave their time
and assistance to participate in the study. Thanks also to the editors and two anonymous
referees from Social Policy and Society, as well as to Sophie Bond, Paul Hickman and
Jenny Muir, for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Interpretation as
ever lies with the author.
Notes
1 The functions of tenant participation are potentially diverse, involving deciding, shaping, delivering
and evaluating housing services. This can range from a one-way information flow, to involvement in
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housing management through formal governance structures. Tenant participation and tenant management
are therefore not necessarily synonymous.
2 Stock transfer has not been a feature of housing policy in Northern Ireland (Paris et al., 2003).
3 This refers to the first Labour−Liberal Democrat coalition government in Scotland, elected in
1999. Following the Scottish election victory of the SNP in 2007, the Scottish Executive has since been
renamed the Scottish Government.
4 The statutory right to participation requires social landlords in Scotland to develop and implement
a tenant participation strategy, to establish arrangements for ‘registering’ tenant groups that meet specified
criteria and to consult with individual tenants and registered tenants’ groups on a range of specific issues
(Scott, 2004).
5 Social Housingmust be allocated on a needs basis, with themost vulnerable tenants being awarded
priority.
6 GHA’s tenant satisfaction survey indicated that 91 per cent of tenants who responded had not
heard of Second Stage Transfer, 57 per cent were not interested in Second Stage Transfer for their area and
39 per cent were unsure whether they wanted it (cited in Communities Scotland, 2007: 46)
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